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The Shock of the Real: Psychoanalysis, modernity, survival 
 











The world wide ‘crisis’ of psychoanalysis is a crisis in its relationship to late 
modernity, or post-modernity, which it also helped to produce. We fear that on 
reading this sentence many psychoanalytic clinicians may switch off, and read 
no further. We hope they will persist. A weakness in most psychoanalytic 
organisations, and in many practitioners, is a reluctance to see that our 
organisations are social institutions, affected by the same currents of social 
change and development as the rest of society. Because of the unique and 
unusual project with which they and their members are engaged 
psychoanalytic institutions are also distinctive, particular, and in certain 
respects unique kinds of organisation. But when it comes to navigating 
change in modern society, such uncritical belief in organisational and 
professional uniqueness is as much of a danger as it is a necessity. Anyway, 
many psychoanalytic thinkers and practitioners hold that its theory and 
practice is rooted in truths that are timeless, universal or at least invariant – 
and thus indifferent at some level to social and cultural change. So, how are 
profound change and timeless truth related, or more pertinently, how are 
contemporary psychoanalytic institutions coping with this tension?  
 
In this chapter we discuss the distinctive task that psychoanalytic institutions, 
and perhaps the whole social institution of psychoanalysis, have in managing 
change. We suggest first, that the very nature of the psychoanalytic ‘project’ 
produces an excessive preoccupation with questions of tradition, hierarchy, 
and authority. We call this the ‘vertical’ dimension of the problem. In turn, 
these preoccupations make it harder to respond realistically, and to take 
seriously, the challenges and changes posed by the social environment in 
which psychoanalysis now operates. Other therapies with their own traditions 
have grown up, flourished, and being completely uninterested in 
psychoanalysis’ preoccupation with itself and its traditions, are challenging it 
within the late modern ‘free’ market of ideas and practices. How do 
psychoanalytic institutions seem to be responding? We call this the ‘lateral’ 
dimension of the problem.  
 
A melancholic voice of tradition 
 
The distinctive and unique character of the psychoanalytic project, and one of 
the characteristic ways in which psychoanalysis defends itself against the 
threat posed by the contemporary environment was illustrated for us when we 
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gave an early version of this chapter as a paper to an institute of 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy in Britain. The paper did issue a clear 
challenge to the audience, which might be summarised as ‘See yourselves as 
others might see you: just another therapeutic institution. So, engage with the 
new rivals, or risk isolation and death’. The second or third speaker from the 
audience then made the following intervention. She said:  
 
“Some years ago, shortly before he died, I had the great 
privilege of having clinical supervision with Dr A (a well known 
senior psychoanalyst), and something he often impressed upon 
me was this – ‘never forget the unconscious’”.  
 
 
We think that direct engagement with the unconscious is the defining feature 
of psychoanalysis, and that from it flows most of our strengths and joys, but 
also most of our woes and tribulations. It was only afterwards that we realised 
how this speaker had simultaneously reminded everyone of both the core of 
what psychoanalytic practitioners are fighting to preserve, and simultaneously 
(and we think unconsciously!) disabled any capacity in the meeting to think 
new thoughts about the problems facing us. The speaker (a senior member of 
a psychotherapy institute) evokes the image of a revered, perhaps idealised, 
but definitely dead psychoanalyst; the sense was of a master at whose feet 
she had been privileged to learn, and of his voice admonishing us from 
beyond the grave with a message that says something like ‘Do not forget or 
betray you central vows…’ 
 
In retrospect, it seems to us that this was a melancholic voice of tradition and 
authority, making its appearance to remind us all not to stray from the true 
path, whatever that may be. It is not a voice that says ‘You may have learned 
much from me, but I am now dead. You must now think your own thoughts, 
live your own life, find you own path – for being dead, I can know nothing of 
the dangers you may now face.’  
 
Slaves of a master discourse?  
 
A central problem faced by psychoanalytic institutes and practitioners is the 
deep rooted assumption that psychoanalysis is a ‘master discourse’. This 
assumption may have been justified in some respects for many decades; but 
no longer. The slaves have been freed, or have freed themselves. They are 
now entitled and feel themselves entitled to vote – and even to elect 
presidents. If this metaphor has resonance, then the history of some societies 
in which enslaved or systematically oppressed peoples have been liberated 
might give psychoanalysis realistic cause for concern. How will the slave treat 
the master now? The particular anxieties faced by psychoanalysis in the 
contemporary period do not therefore derive only from questions of how to 
‘negotiate difference and plurality’; to be sure, that is part of the picture as we 
take up our positions on the more ‘level playing field’ of modern civil society, 
but the more discomforting anxieties of guilt and narcissistic injury in facing a 
history of, if not dictatorship and oppression towards other psychological 
practices, then certainly hubris and arrogance.  
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The culturally arrogant face of psychoanalysis is a cliché, but a cliché with a 
kernel of meaning and truth that psychoanalysis has always found it hard to 
examine. Is it simply that the institutions and practices of psychoanalysis have 
usually been part of the cultural establishment, drawing their membership 
from the same social milieu? Or is something deeper, more psychically ‘trans-
historical’ involved?  We believe it is, and that it takes the following form. The 
possibility of psychoanalysis depends upon an act of extraordinary trust. One 
person agrees to lie down and reveal all that is in their mind to someone they 
do not know who sits out of sight and reveals very little at all. This basic set up 
is necessary, and pretty much all attempts to modify it are, in our view, efforts 
to evade the extreme anxiety it provokes, or should provoke in both patient 
and analyst. For surely, there is nobody who, on agreeing to enter into the 
role of patient, does not feel intensely vulnerable to the psychic gaze of the 
invisible analyst? Defences against this vulnerability may abound, but the core 
experience is surely always present. Whether we think in terms of idealisation 
or persecution, of ego ideal or super-ego, straightaway the central 
preoccupation is with a powerful, imposing, and always potentially judging 
other. There is a paradox at the core of the treatment situation – the 
conditions required to enable the alleviation of mental suffering can and do 
amplify anxiety in the patient. We suggest that this excessive preoccupation 
with the psychic ‘hierarchy’ of potency, judgement and vulnerable dependency 
never departs the psychoanalytic scene. 
 
In an inspired paper, Warren Coleman (2006) has charted the havoc that the 
‘analytic super-ego’ can wreak upon our own psychoanalytic institutions. In a 
similar vein to ourselves, Coleman says (2006: 101), ‘I suggest that the 
leading anxiety in psychoanalytic work is a fear of helplessness, especially 
being powerless to heal the patient’s distress.’ Citing Keneth Eissold (1994) 
he continues:  
 
since being ‘well analysed’  is an important criterion of professional 
acceptance and respect, analysts always feel vulnerable in the eyes of 
their colleagues to the most intimate ad hominem arguments. A vicious 
circle maybe created whereby feelings of anxiety, guilt and inadequacy 
that are an inevitable concomitant of psychoanalytic work are felt to be 
personal failings that may be pointed out and held against them by 





Coleman goes on to describe how psychoanalytic institutions generate 
hierarchies among themselves:  
 
Put briefly, the analysts train the psychoanalytic psychotherapists and 
the psychoanalytic psychotherapists train the psychodynamic 
counsellors. It is therefore no surprise to find among the latter group 
the greatest persecutory anxiety and the most rigid beliefs about 
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analytic rules and boundaries for it is here that the greatest distance 
between analytic ideal and clinical reality is to be found. 
 
(2006 : 111)  
 
 
In effect, part of Coleman’s thesis is that the ‘psychoanalysts’ depend for their 
continuing self esteem and hierarchical dominance upon being able to 
successfully project inferiority or weakness into psychoanalytic 
psychotherapists, who in turn do the same to the ‘counsellors’. But the 
projections also operate both ways, since the supposedly persecuted groups 
may fiercely criticize the ‘analytic arrogance’ of the supposedly dominant ones 
(2006 : 100).  
  
In Britain in the first decade of the 21st century this projective organisation 
which has all the hallmarks of a social system functioning as a defence 
against anxiety (Menzies Lyth, 1960) is breaking down. Many counselling 
trainings, whether psychodynamic or not, could not give a hoot about the 
British Psychoanalytic Society, or what its members might say or think.  
Psychoanalytic institutions and clinical services are everywhere challenged by 
the suddenly emergent confidence of other treatment modalities, and in some 
cases their immeasurably greater skill and application in playing at the politics 
of evidence based therapies. All varieties of psychoanalytic training and 
practice have struggled to come to terms with this new state of affairs.  They 
have done so because, over-preoccupied with their own place in a closed 
system of social and organisational relations, they have lacked the means 
with which to see and respond to what was happening around them in a 
reality based fashion.  
 
The development of relationships to the very much enlarged sibling group with 
whom there is now a continual scrap for recognition and resources - the 
lateral dimension of the predicament - has been retarded by the 
preoccupation with ‘excess hierarchy’, the vertical dimension. The fact is that 
in most psychoanalytic institutions in Britain there are not enough trainees, not 
enough patients to treat, (so a greater proportion of patients are trainees), and 
a visible sense of ageing organisations. In a curious and discomforting 
conjuncture, the continued assumption of automatic privilege in this rivalrous 
arena often co-exists with frantic anxiety about survival. Thus, a central 
question becomes ‘Can these healers heal themselves – can the same 
institutions that have given us the means to ‘psychoanalyse’ organisations 
and systems of social relationships make use of these potent tools to address 





Against the backdrop of this analysis, we want to describe some experiences 
of how psychoanalysis has tried to engage with its own conditions of 
existence as it traverses a period of profound change. These illustrations are 
all based in our own experience and work and  they take as their object our 
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own organisational and social experience as psychoanalytically informed 
‘change agents’ in relation to psychoanalytic institutions. This is what is 
sometimes called ‘reflexivity’ – a variety of ‘thinking about thinking’ that is not 
solipsistic, because it also engages with thought about reality in some tangible 
form. Counter-transference work is a form of reflexivity, as the analyst thinks 
about his or her emotional experience and tries to elucidate who has made 
what contribution to the production of a directly apprehended state of mind. A 
clinical interpretation rooted in counter-transference reflection is an 
intervention in the psychic field produced by patient and analyst with the aim 
of promoting understanding, and possibly psychic change. Likewise, the work 
we discuss in this chapter, and the chapter itself, are intended to be 
interventions in the psychoanalytic cultural and social field.  
 
An aspect of the cultural arrogance of psychoanalysis discussed earlier is 
seen whenever a clinician or theorist deploys psychoanalysis with the aim of 
‘analysing the other’ (be it patient, colleague, organisation, social process) 
from a super-ordinate stance implying privileged access to the unconscious of 
the other, the assumption of such access in turn justifying the epistemological 
and moral right to adopt the super-ordinate stance. This manoeuvre, in which 
the other is ‘positioned’ as a ‘sujet qui est supposé de ne pas savoir’ is the 
precise antithesis of reflexivity, but often masquerades as it. A training in 
psychoanalytic method does confer the advantage of skill or capacity to 
recognise and make sense of unconscious process and communication.  
 
As Bion (1994) observed, ‘It is important to recognise that there is a world in 
which it is impossible to see what a psycho-analyst can see, although it may 
be possible for some of those who come for analysis to realize that we see 
certain things which the rest of the world doesn’t see’. However, this is just a 
rather unusual kind of skill, and in no way justifies the adoption of a morally 
superior stance. A good plumber or electrician knows things that most of us 
do not, but we are justifiably irritated if he or she adopts an attitude, as the 
occasional one does, of moral superiority towards us on the basis of our 
ignorance. The task at hand is to hold on to what we do  know, and know 
about, while coming to terms with a world which accords psychoanalysis less 
automatic deference than it once did. Resolving how to cope with the fall from 
grace of a claim to ‘master discourse’ status, while avoiding the false solutions 
offered by notions of patient-clinician democracy or co-construction of the 
therapeutic process, is a further translation of the contemporary 
psychoanalytic predicament which is the subject of this chapter.  
 
In the realm of social or political analysis, the attitude of psychoanalytic moral 
superiority towards the other often takes the form of a complaint in which 
‘they’ -often those holding political power or influence - are derided for their 
lack of psychological sophistication or appreciation of the irrational 
dimensions of political process. Of course, this is all too often an accurate 
depiction. But the important question is the spirit in which this ‘interpretation’ is 
proffered; is it one that invites dialogue and engagement, or is it one that 
subtly denigrates the political class for their stupidity and concreteness?  At 
the risk of ourselves committing the sin of psychoanalytic arrogance against 
psychoanalysis, it seems to us that the latter is nothing but a variety of 
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narcissistic defence, in which intellectual and moral superiority is re-asserted 
in the face of a threatening and powerful other, and the anxieties of 
engagement and dialogue with this other are evaded.   
 
 
States of mind 
 
 
What does the new social world of early 21st century Britain consist of? What 
should psychoanalytic institutions and their leaders know if they are to 
facilitate a place for psychoanalysis within it? 
 
First, it is a world in which the relationship between ‘representation’ and 
‘reality’ has altered irrevocably, so that we can no longer so confidently assert 
the epistemological or ontological priority of the latter over the former. It 
always was possible to ‘play’ with their relationship, for example to produce 
‘art’, or to deceive, con and manipulate oneself or others – and of course in 
psychoanalytic understanding creativity and perversion are closely related 
Chassegeut Smirgel, 1985). But in the old world if we ‘suspended disbelief’ 
during an evening at the theatre or pursued a course of treacherous action we 
knew, or believed we knew, how to re-discover or re-assert the psychological 
or moral terra firma we had departed from.  It is now somewhat less certain 
that this is the case.  
 
The British welfare state, including the National Health Service and personal 
social services, were forged in a spirit of moral certainty and practical realism 
– the alleviation of poverty, ignorance, disease, unemployment and 
homelessness – that reflected this modernist or enlightenment realism. State 
provision of mental health services formed a part of this project, even if it 
always was too small and undervalued a part. For a time, psychoanalysis 
played an influential though never dominant part in this practical vision. The 
Tavistock and Portman Clinics, the psychiatric social work profession and the 
work of voluntary organisations like the Family Welfare Association 
established a solid and respected place at the heart of the inevitably 
contested terrain of understanding and treatment of mental health difficulties.  
 
If psychoanalysis found an automatic niche within this world, it is because the 
welfare state enacted certain dominant assumptions of the late modern period 
– faith in science, rationality, and humane projects of social improvement. 
Applied psychoanalysis was part of the grand inheritance of the modernist 
project which Marx, Darwin and Freud bequeathed us. Even if most 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy in Britain was conducted outside this milieu in 
private practice, the public/private boundary always was a defining and 
controversial marker. Patients and therapists travelled across this boundary, 
or not, and much depended upon the relative resourcing of both individuals 
and institutions situated either side of this divide. The relative simplicity of this 
social geography was not to last.  
 
The logic of ‘state provision’ and the logic of ‘state-funded provision’ are 
completely different; the logic of the nation state and of the market are equally 
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different. Of course, as the state has retreated and, via the introduction of 
market mechanisms, reconfigured its role in relation to the rest of society 
much of the political history of the last decade has been devoted to convincing 
us otherwise. The market relationships that are now integral to the functioning 
of the NHS, social services and the whole public sector in Britain are not 
those of the so-called perfect or free market; but their radical qualitative 
impact on the nature of mental health work, child care work and so on is not 
diminished because of this. In this world, considerations of cost, efficiency, 
and effectiveness combine with ‘rational’ managerial principles to produce a 
context that continually strives to appear to be, for the moment at least, the 
best of all known worlds. In the competition to produce evidence for 
treatments or interventions, those that have done the best job of playing the 
scientific game can and do present themselves as ‘the best’. Branding, 
marketing, management, cost, efficiency and public legitimation through 
science, move in alongside traditionally grounded truth claims about what 
might really be the best treatment for a particular condition.  
 
Often, the resulting commodification of psychotherapy is much bemoaned by 
psychotherapists. But let us not forget that commodities can do well in 
markets, in part at least because of their inherent qualities. To forget this, is to 
fall prey to a splitting process in which the good old world that valued truth 
and reality has been overwhelmed by the bad new one in which relativism and 
appearances have swept all before them. Equally however, very good 
commodities have disappeared without trace from the market because they 
lost out in the beauty competition of appearances. If this seems like an unfair 
and irrational way to organise human services in our society, we would not 
dispute the judgement. But how well did psychoanalysis listen when 
competitor therapies complained of the unfair hegemony of a world in which 
psychoanalysis just took its privileged place for granted? Was this a just, fair 
and rational way to organise matters?  
 
In our book Borderline Welfare: feeling and fear of feeling in modern welfare 
Cooper & Lousada 2005) we tried to chart our own, and we hope others’, 
experience of the complex and painful transition the British welfare state and 
public sector has made over the last 20 years from one kind of world to 
another. Arguably, the old welfare state, and the individual practices it 
encouraged, was modelled on a metaphor that is instantly recognisable within 
psychoanalytic discourse – the provision of good, unconditional care and 
attention to the ill, unhappy, distressed, lost, conflicted, needy, self of the 
patient or client.  If this metaphor has lost much of its resonance, this is 
because it has been purposefully elbowed aside to make room for a new one 
– that of the rational, strategic, calculating, consumer of opportunity in the 
market place of health and welfare choice. In subsequent work we looked at 
the more objective political and policy conditions that explain the hold this 
metaphor has had for recent governments (Cooper 2008). But however one 
views the modern British state and its relationship to civil society, it is a 
different animal to the one that most ‘senior’ figures in our psychotherapy 
institutes grew up with, and its younger citizens are different too – less 
deferential, more questioning, more strategic, choosier perhaps. By no means 
the pure ‘consumers’ of rational choice economic theory and as all the 
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research evidence indicates, not necessarily ‘happier’; but if anything probably 
less persuaded than previous generations that psychoanalysis or its close 
relatives offer any answers.   
 
In this climate what is the task facing psychoanalysis and its associated 
practices? We suggest it is confidently to re-assert its commitment to what 
might be called epistemological realism – a doctrine in which human suffering, 
mental pain and unconscious experience are understood to be real, knowable 
phenomena with direct material effects on personal and social life - while also 
accepting a more modest, contributory position than hitherto in the much more 
open, fluid and contested field of ideas and practices that constitute our late 
modern cultural milieu.  
 
 
And minds of state… 
 
 
What does the theory and practice of psychoanalytic psychotherapy have to 
do with freedom? Are the contemporary challenges facing psychoanalysis a 
threat to the pursuit of human freedom which its practices are deemed to 
embody? The 21st century context of professional regulation for the 
psychotherapy professions, itself a reflection of the wider direction of ‘market 
state’ travel, creates a sharp division in responses to these questions. On the 
one hand are those who hold that the ‘stranglehold’ of state bureaucracy is a 
direct threat to the inalienable freedoms of the consulting room; on the other 
are those who hold that psychoanalysis and its associated therapies are 
unique contributors to the project of sustaining a socially organised response 
to mental pain, trauma, and the inter-generational transmission of psychic 
damage. As Michael Rustin has said:  
 
…the idea that mental pain and anxiety constitute valid claims on social 
attention has import for broader principle of social organisation, 
qualifying and constraining the logic of markets or bureaucracies of as 
arbiters of social life. 
 
It seems that different perspectives on unconscious aspects of mental 
life give rise to different political and social outlooks. Outright denial of 
the existence of the unconscious domain within the behaviourist 
psychological tradition typically generates interest-based and coercive 
models of social organization. Insistence, by contrast on the repressive 
aspects of all symbolized social order generates a countervailing 
politics of resistance and ‘subversion’, tending to demand the 
overthrow of the ‘authoritarian symbolic’… 
 
(Rustin, 1995: 241)  
 
Psychoanalysis has always had a number of ‘radical’ wings, though none of 
them can be complacent about their ability to have freed themselves from the 
illness of cultural arrogance discussed earlier. Rustin is pointing out the 
relationship between different conceptions of the psychoanalytic project (and 
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of the unconscious) and the very different political strategies that tend to flow 
from these, including strategies for the institutions of psychoanalysis itself 
within processes of social change. In Britain today, those who support the 
project of professional regulation for psychoanalytic psychotherapy, which is 
to say the incorporation of psychoanalytic psychotherapy within the confines 
of state scrutiny, legitimation, inspection, and so on may have many well 
founded anxieties about the potential for external bureaucratic impingements. 
However the leading umbrella organisation for psychoanalytic psychotherapy, 
the British Psychoanalytic Council (BPC 2008, 2008a), has positioned itself 
clearly within a psychoanalytic tradition of radical social provision, first 
outlined by Freud himself:  
 
At present we can do nothing for the wider social strata, who suffer 
extremely seriously from the neuroses…the poor man should have just 
as much right to assistance for his mind as he now has to the life 
saving help offered by surgery…out-patient clinics will be started to 
which analytically trained physicians will be appointed… 
 
(Freud, 1955)   
 
From this starting point, the only important question is whether a political 
position inside the apparatus of state regulation, or even a position ‘in and 
against’ this state apparatus constitutes a viable site of struggle towards 
greater ‘positive’ freedoms for the general population, who need access to 
highly trained, responsible psychoanalytic mental health clinicians. Set 
against this perspective, the objections of some to the feared intrusion of 
regulatory principles into the free associative space in which psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy takes place, appear abstract, philosophically self-indulgent and 
individualist. The struggle for psychic freedom and the struggle for social and 
political freedom are linked – and both occur under conditions of inevitable 
and necessary constraint. Psychoanalysis never conceived of itself (except in 
certain romantic appropriations) as a practice that could or would promise 
deliverance into a world of absolute freedom; Freud and every major 
subsequent psychoanalytic theorist are at one with the spirit of Karl Marx’s 
thought  here: Men make their own history but not under conditions of their 
own choosing.  
 
Of course, it is possible that the British state bureaucratic machine will 
develop in a direction that requires from psychoanalysis a different, more 
politically challenging response. But like all judgements about political action, 
this is one that depends upon the ‘material conditions’ that pertain at any point 
in time. How bad does it have to be before psychotherapists take up arms 
against the state? In one sense no one can answer this question before it 
happens. But before even contemplating the answer, one might consider all 
the evidence we already do have for the link between mental pain and social 
conditions that both the state and psychotherapists continually ‘forget’. This 
knowledge is the ground on which a real psycho-political struggle – with huge 
and real potential benefits for the population - could now be fought, if only 
both parties were not complicit in this defence of forgetting. These are some 
of the salient facts.  
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High quality research conducted over many years in many countries 
convincingly shows that the prevalence of mental health problems in any one 
country is directly correlated with the level of income inequality in that country, 
that is a to say a measure of how much more is earned by the richest one fifth 
of the population, compared to the poorest fifth (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). 
Many other measures of social and personal distress and dysfunction are 
similarly correlated with income inequality. As it happens Britain emerges 
rather badly from this particular set of league tables, simply because, 
assessed by this criterion, it is one of the most unequal countries in the 
developed world.  
 
Research conducted some decades ago into the ‘social origins’ of depression 
(Brown & Harris, 1978) showed how the prevalence of clinical depression 
among women is significantly a function of social class, mediated by a specific 
group of ‘vulnerability factors’ which, in the presence of significant adverse life 
events (but not without these), trigger depression. Some of these ‘vulnerability 
factors’ (such as the loss of the subject’s mother in childhood) point towards 
the importance of causal factors that are familiar to psychoanalytic 
psychotherapists. But many of the significant causal variables in this study are 
not straightforwardly psychological or intra-psychic. Wilkinson and Pickett are 
interested not just in the correlations they have unearthed, but in the 
explanatory mechanisms that might link social inequality with, for example, a 
history of mental health problems.  
 
But how interested are most psychoanalytic psychotherapists in these 
perspectives? How do they account for the powerful explanatory force of 
findings such as these, and the seemingly radical disjunction with traditional 
psychoanalytic theory they imply? According to these other perspectives 
mental health and illness seem, at a minimum, to be psycho-social 
phenomena even if not ‘political’ ones – though the link with material 
inequalities makes it hard to avoid this latter suggestion. If this is so, and 
psychotherapists are treating the same, or similar, people who are the 
research subjects in these studies, surely the question must arise: ‘What are 
the right forms of practical and moral engagement of the psychoanalytic 
psychotherapist as psychotherapist with the society in which she or he 
practises? Can the psychotherapist and the citizen or political subject be 




Does the psychodynamic counsellor have anything to teach the 
psychoanalyst about the practice of therapy? Does the psychodynamic 
counsellor have anything to teach the analyst about the nature of unconscious 
processes?  
 
The questions are designed to disturb – to disrupt some taken for granted 
assumptions about professional and training hierarchies that for too long have 
organised the internal and external world of psychoanalysis and 
psychotherapy in this country. To secure its future in the late-modern, 21st 
century marketised world psychoanalysis must learn to travel ‘more lightly’, to 
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free itself from any melancholic attachment to its founders, from the need to 
maintain hierarchies of privilege and status rather than hierarchies of meaning 
and expertise. These ‘vertical’ and ‘lateral’ dimensions of the problem facing 
psychoanalysis are intertwined with many other antinomies that require a 
more fluid engagement: the pure and the applied, the public and private, the 
ancient and the modern, the professional and the political… 
 
To recapitulate: as a psychoanalytic psychotherapist, how one engages with 
the public or social sphere may depend very significantly on how, at root, one 
frames the task of psychoanalytic therapy itself. Is it primarily a treatment for 
mental pain and distress, or is it primarily a method for investigating and 
learning about unconscious processes? These are not the only possible 
alternatives, nor are they absolutely mutually exclusive ones, but maybe they 
do help us to bring into focus the very different and not always explicit self-
images and images of others that we deploy. If psychoanalytic psychotherapy 
is primarily a treatment for mental pain, then the question ‘Can a 
psychodynamic counsellor have anything to teach a psychoanalyst’ will seem 
neither surprising or contradictory – they will do so because many 
psychodynamic counsellors work in public and publically funded settings with 
populations  who are unlikely ever to access psychoanalysis. How to work 
effectively in once weekly short term treatments, or how to consult effectively 
to hard pressed General Practitioners or Practice Nurses are among the many 
matters that counsellors may be better equipped to tackle and advise upon 
than is a psychoanalyst in full time private  practice. In the complex, messy 
world of front line mental health services, the psychoanalyst possesses very 
few privileges in our view.  
 
But if psychoanalysis or psychoanalytic work of any kind is only possible on 
the basis of a sophisticated appreciation of unconscious processes, then here 
the traditional remit of the psychoanalyst must surely reign. Working 
analytically at five times week intensity over many years constitute the 
privileged ‘laboratory conditions’ for experiencing, elucidating and theorising 
the nature of the unconscious and the complex configurations of desire, 
defence, history and possibility that is human development. This is the same 
work that Freud himself began, and the same work that underpinned is radical 
call for psychoanalysis to be widely available as a response to both personal 
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